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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The appellants Evan 0. and Marlene B. Roller ("Rollers"),
appeal from certain decisions of the Honorable VeNoy
Christoffersen, District Judge, in connection with the condemnation action brought by Cornish Town ("Cornish") entitled
Cornish Town v. Evan 0. Roller, et al., Civil No. 25058, First
Judicial Court of Cache County, State of Utah, to condemn
certain property of the defendants in connection with improvements to and the creation of a protection zone around a
municipal water system.

This court has jurisdiction of this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (1987).
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT STATUTORY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
In addition to the relevant statutory provisions set forth
by the Rollers in their brief, which are not repeated here, the
court's attention is directed to the following:
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-1(3) (1987).

This Section

states:
78-34-1.

Uses for which right may be exercised.

Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the
right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of
the following public uses:

(3) public buildings and grounds for the use of
any county, city or incorporated town, or board of
education; reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes,
ditches, or pipes for conducting water for the use of
the inhabitants of any county or city or incorporated

-1-

town, or for the draining of any county, city or
incorporated town; the raising of the banks of streams,
removing obstructions therefrom, and widening, deepening or straightening their channels; roads, streets
and alleys; and all other public uses for the benefit
of any county, city or incorporated town, or the
inhabitants thereof. (Emphasis added.)
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 (1986).

This Section states:

10-7-4. Water supply — Acquisition —
— Protest — Special election.

Condemnation

The board of commissioners, city council or board
of trustees of any city or town may acquire, purchase
or lease all or any part of any water, waterworks
system, water supply or property connected therewith,
and whenever the governing body of a city or town
shall deem it necessary for the public good such city
or town may bring condemnation proceedings to acquire
the same; provided, that if within thirty days after
the passage and publication of a resolution or
ordinance for the purchase or lease or condemnation
herein provided for one-third of the resident taxpayers of the city or town, as shown by the assessment
roll, shall protest against the purchase, lease or
condemnation proceedings contemplated, such proposed
purchase, lease or condemnation shall be referred to a
special election, and if confirmed by a majority vote
thereat, shall take effect; otherwise it shall be
void. In all condemnation proceedings the value of
land affected by the taking must be considered in
connection with the water or water rights taken for
the purpose of supplying the city or town or the
inhabitants thereof with water. (Emphasis added.)
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-18(1) (1986).

This Section

states:
10-8-18.
escrow.

Acquisition of water sources —

Retainage

(1) They may construct, purchase or lease and
maintain canals, ditches, artesian wells and reservoirs, may appropriate, purchase or lease springs,
streams or sources of water supply for the purpose of
providing water for irrigation, domestic or other
useful purposes; may prevent all waste of water flowing from artesian wells, and if necessary to secure

-2-

sources of water supply may purchase or lease land;
they may also purchase, acquire or lease stock in
canal companies and water companies for the purpose of
providing water for the city and the inhabitants
thereof. (Emphasis added.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This action was commenced by Cornish Town to condemn

approximately 100 acres of the Rollers1 property for the
purpose of creating protection zones above the Griffiths and
Pearson Springs (the "Springs") located on the Rollers'
property and which provide culinary water to the residents of
Cornish Town.

Cornish also sought to condemn approximately 7

acres of Rollers' property to provide rights-of-way for access
to the Springs.
B.

The Course of Proceedings Below and Statement of Facts.
Cornish filed this action in July, 1986 to condemn certain

property of the Rollers through the statutory power of eminent
domain.

(R. at 1). In its original complaint, Cornish sought

to condemn a fee simple in certain protection zones around the
Springs.

They also sought to condemn certain rights-of-way to

provide access to the Springs.

The only previous access was to

walk into the Springs along a pipeline.

This did not give

Cornish the ability to bring equipment in to repair and maintain the collection works.

(Transcript, Hearing on Order of

Immediate Occupancy, October 8019, 1986, [hereinafter "Transcript, Hearing"] p. 6-8).

-3-

Cornish Town initiated this action because the State Board
of Health told Cornish to make necessary improvements and
repairs to the Town water system, including reducing the level
of nitrates in the spring water.
10-11).

(Transcript, Hearing, p.

Cornish thereafter passed a resolution of condemnation

to condemn the property in question.
15).

(Transcript, Hearing, p.

Cornish determined that a protection zone around the

Springs was necessary in order to try to control the nitrate
problem.

(Transcript, Hearing, p. 12). State water quality

officials told Cornish that agricultural fertilization
contributed to the high nitrate levels.

(Transcript, Hearing,

p. 14).
Cornish filed a motion of immediate occupancy of the
property on July 29, 1986.

(R. at 11) The court held a 3-day

hearing on October 8 through 10, 1986 during which the
plaintiff put on evidence of a public use and necessity and
defendants put on evidence attempting to show no such use.
Contrary to defendants' assertion, the trial court considered
the Rollers' evidence wherein they attempted to refute
plaintiff's claim of public use and necessity.
The court in reviewing the evidence found that there had
been intermittent problems with Cornish's water supply in that
it had failed to meet water quality standards.
Hearing p. 455-456).

(Transcript,

The court noted that state water quality

officials had made recommendations regarding the acquisition of
a 1,500 ft. protection zone around the Springs.
-4-

(Transcript,

Hearing p. 456). The court noted that witnesses had indicated
that the nitrate problem at the Springs had resulted from
agricultural use.

The trial court considered the facts set

forth on pages 9 through 14 of Appellants' Brief and concluded
that these facts did not rebut Cornish's evidence of public use
and necessity.

(See, e.g., Transcript, Hearing p. 450-460.)

The court emphasized that Cornish had authority under the
right of eminent domain to acquire property to protect their
water system and that the statute authorized this condemnation
proceeding.

The court also held that, given the history of the

problems of the Town of Cornish with its water system, the
complaints made by the State as to water quality, the recommendations by State agencies regarding an attempt to solve the
problem and the fact that Cornish acted under these valid
recommendations, the taking was necessary for a public use.
(Transcript, Hearing p. 458). In connection therewith, the
court made the following findings:

"that there is sufficient

testimony to show the necessity of something being done by
Cornish to do something to their water supply so they can meet
the requirements as far as adequate and pure water supply.
That they have reviewed and selected this method and I do not
find from the evidence that they acted unreasonably or that
they acted in bad faith in doing so."
460 [emphasis added]).

(Transcript, Hearing p.

Thus, the court concluded that Cornish

did not act in bad faith and did not abuse its discretion in
pursuing this condemnation action.
-5-

The court entered an order of immediate occupancy on
December 16, 1986.

(R. at 137). Thereafter, defendants filed

a motion for partial summary judgment (R. at 416) to determine
that the date of taking of the property condemned was
September, 1981 at the time the town enacted Ordinance 81-1 (R.
at 431). That motion was denied.

(R. at 579). On February

9-12, 1988 a jury trial was held before the Honorable VeNoy
Christopherson, District Judge, First Judicial District Court.
The jury awarded judgment on a special verdict of $59,670.00
(R. at 640). Final judgment on this special jury verdict and a
taking of perpetual easements and right-of-way was entered by
the district court on May 13, 1988 (R. at 131) and an amended
final judgment was entered June 13, 1988 (R. at 494).
At the trial, the Rollers petitioned the court to hear
evidence as to the claims of public use and necessity of the
property being condemned.

(Trial Tr., Vol. 1, p. 10.)

The

court denied the motion concluding that all issues as to public
use and necessity were determined by the court at the hearing
on the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that the court would
not disturb the plaintiff's determination of the issues of
public use and necessity.

(Trial Tr., Vol. 1, p. 10.)

On the

morning of the first day of trial, the Rollers attempted to put
on evidence regarding the value of deposits of minerals underlying the property condemned.

Defendants did not previously

raise a claim of valuable mineral rights by their pleadings or
otherwise and never put Cornish on notice of this claim prior
-6-

to the morning of the first day of trial.

(Trial Tr., Vol. 1,

p. 4.)
Upon learning of the Rollers' claim, Cornish moved to amend
its pleadings to acquire only a perpetual easement.
Tr., Vol. 1, p. 15.)

(Trial

This action was mandated by the relevant

statute which provides that "where surface ground is underlaid
with minerals . . . sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpetual easement may be taken over the surface
ground over such deposits."
(1987).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2(1)

The court granted the motion to amend the complaint

and denied the Rollers' motion to put on evidence as to the
value of the underlying mineral rights.

The court held that

the assertion of the claim of mineral rights was untimely.
(Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 4.)

Moreover, the court held that the

issue of whether the Rollers had a right to extract the
minerals underlying the surface should be determined at a later
time.

(Trial Tr., Vol. 2, pp. 11-12.)

The court found that

there was no indication of any prior use or ongoing extraction
of minerals on the Roller property even up to the date of trial
and that the claim was therefore very speculative in nature.
(Trial Tr., Vol. 3 p. 4.)
Contrary to the Rollers' assertion in their statement of
facts and argument, the court also allowed them to introduce
evidence on the highest and best use of the property as a dry
land farm with wildlife resources of a deer herd as that use
reflected on fair market value and severance damages.
-7-

In

connection with the deer herd, the court held that the Rollers
were entitled to put on evidence that a willing buyer would pay
less for their remaining property after taking because of the
damage done to the potential value of the hunting rights.
(Trial Tr. , Vol. 1, p. 87.)

The Rollers' appraiser, using an

income approach in assessing the value of the wildlife
potential, calculated a value of $52,742.00 as an incremental
increase to fair market value of the property.

(Trial Tr.,

Vol. 2, p. 66-70.)
After trial, the court denied Rollers' claim for attorneys'
fees and costs based upon an assertion that Cornish abandoned
claims for a fee simple in the property.

The trial court held

that there was no abandonment because Cornish did not dismiss
the cause of action as required by the statute to effectuate an
abandonment and that although the proceedings were changed
because of the statute to seek only a perpetual easement, this
did not constitute abandonment.

(Tr., Hearing 3-23-88, p.

31-32.)
The Rollers also sought an award of costs of $2,252.65 (R.
833-34).

The court awarded costs of $74.00 (R. 960). The

court disallowed the remaining expenses for photocopies,
exhibits, photographs and other items as not properly taxable
costs.

(R. 833, 960). Thereafter, the Rollers took this

appeal.

-8-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the district court in all
respects.

The district court's rulings on issues of law were

correct and its rulings on evidentiary issues did not
constitute an abuse of discretion.
The district court determined that there had been no
showing of bad faith, fraud or an abuse of discretion and that
public use and necessity had been established by Cornish to
justify the condemnation of the property in question.

There-

fore, the court appropriately did not submit the issues of
public use and necessity to the jury for determination.
The enactment of town ordinances, which were never
enforced, did not reach the status of a regulatory taking.

The

Rollers were not deprived of economically viable uses of their
property.

Moreover, the date of taking for purposes of deter-

mining just compensation was appropriately held to be the date
of service of summons rather than the enactment date of
Ordinance 81-1.
Immediately following the Rollers' assertion that valuable
mineral rights underlaid the property to be taken in fee,
Cornish amended its complaint to seek only a perpetual easement
as it was required to do by statute.

The Rollers' attempt to

characterize this action as an "abandonment" must fail since
the Utah statute contemplates a knowing, voluntary dismissal of
the condemnation action which did not occur in this proceeding.

Moreover, the abandonment statute was designed to protect
-9-

a condemnee in circumstances where, having begun, the condemnor
counts the risk too high and terminates the condemnation proceeding altogether.

In this case, given the Rollers' delay in

asserting the claim of valuable mineral rights, as a matter of
policy the claim for attorneys' fees and costs should be
rejected.
The trial court properly excluded evidence of the value of
mineral rights as untimely and speculative.

The court had

considerable discretion in admitting or excluding this evidence
and its determinations should not be overturned unless an abuse
of discretion is shown.

Here, given the fact that there was no

ongoing use or previous extraction of the minerals and no
present plans to extract them, the court properly kept this
issue from the jury and concluded that this issue appropriately
should be resolved when, and if, the Rollers were to start
extracting the minerals.
The court allowed the Rollers to put on evidence of the
value of a wildlife resource on the property, namely a herd of
deer, as that impacted on fair market value and the highest and
best use of the property.

The jury considered the value of a

wildlife resource as it reflected on highest and best use of
the property.

The court appropriately refused to allow the

Rollers to put on evidence of future profits from the future
sale of hunting access permits as an independent and separate
element of compensation in addition to the fair market value
calculation.
-10-

The court also denied Rollers' expenses of $2,252.65 as not
being taxable costs.

The expenses claimed by the Rollers were

not required to be paid to the court or to witnesses and thus,
did not fall into the category of taxable costs.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING
AS A MATTER OF LAW THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC USE
AND NECESSITY.
A.

The Standard of Review Proposed by the Appellants is
Erroneous and is not the Appropriate Standard Here.
Rollers propose that in considering these issues on appeal,

the court apply a standard of review of viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to them.
standard.

This is an erroneous

The case cited by Rollers in support of their

proposed standard of review, National American Life Ins. Co. v.
Bayou Country Club, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26 (1965)
does not deal with the standard of review to be applied in an
eminent domain proceeding.

It involved an action to collect a

promissory note and is inapposite.
The appropriate standard of review to be applied in connection with the evidentiary issues raised in this appeal is that
the decisions of the trial court should be affirmed unless it
is found that the trial court abused its discretion.

See State

Road Commission v, Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 495 P.2d 817
(1972).

In particular, the trial court has considerable

discretion in admitting or excluding evidence, and the court's
-11-

ruling on evidentiary issues should not be disturbed unless it
appears that the court abused its discretion.

_Id. at 820.

The fundamental principle in condemnation actions is that
what the parties are entitled to is a fair opportunity to
present their respective cases to a court and jury for determination.

When this has been accomplished, all presumptions

favor the validity of the verdict and the judgment; and this
includes all aspects of the conduct of the proceedings and
rulings of the court.

The burden is upon the appellant to show

not only that there was error, but that it was substantial and
prejudicial and that, as a result, they were in some manner
deprived of a full and fair presentation and consideration of
the disputed issues. Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v.
Mitsui Investment, Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1374 (Utah 1974).
Even if it should be determined that the trial court erred
in its judicial rulings, this Court must consider whether the
error was prejudicial.

An error in anything done or omitted by

the court shall be disregarded unless it affects the substantial rights of the parties.

Redevelopment Agency of Roy v.

Jones, 743 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah App. 1987).

Such an error is

harmless unless it would have had a "substantial influence in
bringing about a different verdict."

Redevelopment Agency of

Salt Lake City v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-04 (Utah 1987).
In reviewing such an error, the evidence is viewed in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict.
1206, 1208 (Utah 1983).
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Hill v. Hartog, 658 P.2d

It is clear, as set forth below, that the trial court did
not abuse its considerable latitude or discretion and therefore
its rulings should not be disturbed on appeal.
B.

The Trial Court Appropriately Determined as a Matter of Law
that Cornish Town had Made a Showing of Public Use and
Necessity.
The court's review authority as to the "necessity" of the

taking, is governed by the following statute:
Before property can be taken it must appear:
(1) That the use to which it is to be applied is
a use authorized by law;
(2) That the taking is necessary to such use;
(3) That construction and use of all property
sought to be condemned will commence within a reasonable time as determined by the court, after the
initiation of proceedings under this chapter; and
(4) If already appropriated to some public use,
that the public use to which it is to be applied is a
more necessary public use.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-4 (1987).

Clearly, it is for the court

to determine, as a matter of law, that the conditions precedent
in Section 78-34-4 are present.
1.

The Public Use Here Was Authorized by Statute.

The public use for which Cornish condemned the Rollers'
property was a use authorized by statute.
§ 78-34-1(3) (1987).

See Utah Code Ann.

Section 10-7-4 of the Utah Code relating

to cities and towns states that a town may acquire all or any
part of a water works system or property connected therewith
and may bring a condemnation action to acquire the
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same.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-7-4 (1986).

Section 10-8-14

provides that a town may construct, maintain and operate a
water works system.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-4 (1986).

Section

10-8-15 provides that a town may exercise extra-territorial
jurisdiction for the purpose of maintaining and protecting from
injury and pollution its water works system.
§ 10-8-15 (1986).

Utah Code Ann.

Section 10-8-18 provides that a town may

purchase springs and, if necessary to secure sources of water
supply, may purchase or lease land.

Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-18

(1986) .
The court here determined as a threshold issue that Cornish
Town had the right to take the Rollers' property for a public
use.

The presumption exists that a use is public if the

legislature has declared it to be such.

The legislature's

decision must be treated with the consideration due to a
co-ordinate department of the government of the state.

Where a

public use is expressly authorized by statute, the court can
easily make, as it did here, a determination that there exists
statutory authorization for the taking.
2.

The Taking by Cornish Also Met the "Necessity"

Requirement.
Under Utah law, the question of public necessity is
basically a political question that is generally not disturbed
by the court in the absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of
discretion.

"[N]ecessity, expediency or propriety in

[condemning property for a public use] is a political question
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and in absence of fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion,
[such action] will not be disturbed by the courts."

Bountiful

v. Swift, 535 P.2d 1236, 1238 (Utah 1975); see also Oqden v.
Stephens, 21 Utah 2d 336, 339, 445 P.2d 703, 705 (1968).
The statement from Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, 567 P.2d
182 (Utah 1977), cited by Rollers on page 20 of their brief,
appears at first glance to be at odds with Swift and Stephens,
supra.

However, the Ramoselli case involved the acquisition of

park land in a situation where there were no immediate plans
for development.

The court focused on the fact that there

wasn't even a projected need in the foreseeable future for the
park.

In other words, Salt Lake County did not even have a

general idea of what they were going to do with that ground.
They were simply trying to acquire ground to protect their
future needs down the road.

That case also focused on the

absence of any funds, budgeted or appropriated, for the
acquisition of the property.

_Id. at 184.

Ramoselli can best be viewed not really as a challenge to
the authority to condemn, but as an abuse of discretion case.
That is, in the absence of some reasonable belief that it was
necessary to acquire the land, it was an abuse of discretion to
do so since there was no evidence that Salt Lake County had any
reasonably foreseeable use for that property or plans to use
it.

The facts in that case stand squarely in opposition to the

facts here.

This is not a case where there are no plans for

development in the reasonably foreseeable future.
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Instead, the

Town intended to make immediate improvements to the town water
supply system.
In two cases decided subsequent to Ramoselli, however, the
Court reaffirmed the traditional limited role of the judiciary
in reviewing a determination of necessity by the condemnor.

In

Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684 (Utah 1979),
the trial court found that the taking of the particular site by
the condemnor was not necessary since there were other satisfactory alternative sites available.

On appeal this Court

reversed, holding that the defendants presented no proof and
the trial court made no finding that the plaintiff's exercise
in selecting this particular property was a product of bad
faith, fraud, caprice, or arbitrariness.

Jd- at 688. The

plaintiff had met its initial burden of showing that the taking
was reasonably requisite to effect the authorized public
purpose for which it was sought.

Once that burden was met,

particular questions as to the location or amount of property
to be taken were left to the sound discretion of the condemning
authority absent a showing by clear and convincing evidence
that such determinations are the product of fraud, caprice, or
arbitrariness.

Ld. at 688, quoting Fairbanks v. Metro Co., 540

P.2d 1056, 1058 (Alaska 1975).
In Utah Dept. of Transportation v. Fuller, 603 P.2d 814
(Utah 1979), relied upon by the trial court here, the Court
also reaffirmed the traditional rule.

In Fuller, defendants

urged that the proposed location of a sewage lagoon was
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arbitrarily determined and that its construction would
constitute a waste of public funds.
defendant's contentions.

The court rejected the

With regard to the selection of the

particular site, the court stated:
It may be said to be a general rule that, unless a
corporation exercising the power of eminent domain
acts in bad faith or is guilty of oppression, its
discretion in the selection of land will not be
interfered with. With the degree of necessity or the
extent which the property will advance the public
purpose, the court have nothing to do: when the use is
public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating
any particular property is not a subject of judicial
cognizance.
Id. at 817, quoting Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Utah v. Oregon
S.L.R. Co., 23 Utah 474, 484-485, 65 P. 735, 739 (1901).

The

court also quoted Nichols with respect to the limitation on the
scope of judicial review:
[T]he legislature may, and usually does, delegate the
power of selecting the land to be condemned to the
public agent that is to do the work; in such case it
makes little, if any, difference whether the grant of
authority is, in terms, limited to such land as is
"necessary" for the purpose in view, for a general
grant of authority carries the same limitation by
implication and in either case the necessity is for
the condemnor and not for the court to decide, and the
decision of such condemnor is final as long as it acts
reasonably and in good faith. (Emphasis added by the
Court).
Utah Department of Transportation v. Fuller, supra, 603 P.2d at
817; 1 Nichols an Eminent Domain, § 4.11[3] at 4-184, 4-185.
The general rule in Utah thus remains unchanged that unless
there is bad faith, fraud, or abuse of discretion, the determination of the condemning authority will not be disturbed.
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The burden is on the appellant to plead and prove such
conditions by clear and convincing evidence.

Williams v. Hyrum

Gibbons & Sons, supra, 602 P.2d at 688. Appellants did not
plead fraud or bad faith and thus are barred from raising these
issues at this stage in the proceedings.

In fact, appellants'

counsel specifically waived any allegation of fraud on the part
of Cornish in pursuing the condemnation during the hearing on
immediate occupancy.

(Transcript, Hearing pp. 37-38).

In the

absence of any allegations or evidence of fraud, bad faith or
abuse of discretion, the trial court correctly ruled that it
would not disturb Cornish's determination that the condemnation
was necessary.
The Court, in any event, heard three days of testimony on
the issue of necessity and found that Cornish did not act
unreasonably, in bad faith or arbitrarily.

Considerable

evidence was presented by both sides at the hearing on the
order of immediate occupancy as to the question of public use
and necessity.

The evidence was conflicting in nature, but the

trial judge found believable testimony, as he was empowered to
do, in favor of the plaintiff.

When a trial judge, in

resolving conflicting questions of fact, makes findings
supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court should
not interfere with that decision.

Bountiful v. Swift, supra,

535 P.2d at 1238.
The only possible ground upon which the determination of
necessity could be overturned would be if there had been an
-18-

abuse of discretion by Cornish.

The evidence is clear,

however, that there was no abuse of discretion.

Although there

were disagreements at the hearing on the order of immediate
occupancy about the impact of a protection zone on nitrate
levels in the spring water, this disagreement among experts did
not indicate an abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion

would require the absence of any rational basis to support the
decision of the Cornish Town Council to pursue condemnation.
It is clear that Cornish's actions were based upon the
recommendations of its experts that the probable source of
nitrate contamination of the springs was the use of fertilizers
in the protection area.

The experts recommended to the town

council that they acquire the protection zones to alleviate
this problem (Transcript, Hearing p. 429). Experts determined
that the probable source of the nitrates was related to the
agriculture being performed around and above the springs.
(Transcript, Hearing p. 211). It was opined that farming
practices were most likely the source of the nitrates in the
soil.

(Transcript, Hearing p. 213-214).

Other probable

explanations, including nitrate sources naturally in the
bedrock, were ruled out.

(Transcript, Hearing p. 222-223).

State officials indicated that, based upon the studies
conducted and the best scientific evidence available, a
protection zone would be beneficial.
p. 126).

-19-

(Transcript, Hearing

It is clear from the evidence that the Town had a rational
basis to conclude that condemnation of a protection zone around
the water system would allow for the protection of the town's
water system and would possibly reduce nitrate levels. Moreover, the condemnation of rights-of-way would allow access to
repair and maintain the springs.

The town's action then had a

rational basis.
Even in the absence of a determination that the protection
zones around the springs might specifically alleviate the
nitrate problem because farming practices were being conducted
within that protection zone using nitrate fertilizers, the Town
would still have been entitled to acquire such protection zones
for the prevention of future contamination of its water source.
Therefore, the court did find that the town met its burden
of showing the right to condemn because the taking of the property was necessary for a public use.

The court examined the

evidence and correctly found that Cornish had met its burden of
showing public use and necessity.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO ALLOW
DEFENDANTS TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF PUBLIC USE
AND NECESSITY TO THE JURY.
The appellants argue that the trial court erred in failing
to submit the issue of public use and necessity to the jury.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 25.)

This is erroneous.

The deter-

minations of public use and necessity are clearly questions of
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law to be determined by the court.

See Bountiful v. Swift,

supra, 535 P.2d at 1238 (the trial judge is given the power to
hear and decide if the conditions precedent to the taking are
met); Perry v. Thomas, 82 Utah 159, 22 P.2d 343, 346 (1933)
(whether property is being taken for public use is a judicial
question for the court).
Appellant's argument that the jury should have heard
evidence of public use and necessity is also erroneous because
this issue was resolved at the hearing on the motion for order
of immediate occupancy.

The court did not err in refusing to

allow the appellants to submit the same evidence on these
issues to the jury.

This Court has stated:

Whenever issues pertaining to authority or
jurisdiction to condemn exist at the time an order of
immediate occupancy is sought, the best interests of
all concerned, including the court, dictate that those
issues be resolved prior to issuance of the order.
Otherwise, the condemnor runs the risk of defeat and
the resultant loss of funds expended in preparing the
property for its new use. Similarly, the condemnee
runs the risk of irreparable harm to the property if
the condemnor is permitted to occupy and alter the
property to accommodate the new use.
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Tanner, supra, 740
P.2d at 1300.
The hearing on the order of immediate occupancy was a full
blown evidentiary hearing.
a prima facie case.

It involved more than a showing of

Evidence supporting and attempting to

refute the public use and necessity was fully considered.
Accordingly, the trial court appropriately determined the
issues of public use and necessity at the time of the hearing
-21-

on the order of immediate occupancy and did not err in keeping
this issue from a jury.

Furthermore, plaintiffs did not raise

any new evidentiary issues but simply sought to have those same
matters considered by the jury.
POINT THREE
THE ENACTMENT OF A TOWN ORDINANCE DID NOT
CONSTITUTE THE TAKING OF ROLLERS' PROPERTY
NOR SHOULD THE ENACTMENT DATE OF THE
ORDINANCE BE THE VALUATION DATE OF THE
PROPERTY ACTUALLY TAREN BY EMINENT DOMAIN.
A.

The Passage of Ordinance 81-1 did not Constitute a
Compensable "Taking" of Rollers' Property.
The Rollers claim that passage of Ordinance 81-1 by Cornish

Town resulted in the denial of all beneficial and economically
viable use of 85 percent of their total property and decreased
the value of their property by 85-90 percent.

Their argument,

in essence, is that the mere enactment of the ordinance, in and
of itself, constituted a taking of approximately 85 percent of
their property rather than the relatively small amount of
property eventually condemned by Cornish.
Athough this claim was never framed by the Rollers' pleadings, the Rollers brought a motion for partial summary judgment
on this issue.

The trial court found that the ordinance did

not reach the status of a regulatory taking and that the ordinance did not prohibit the Rollers use of the property but was
only an attempt to stop the use of such chemicals that pollute
the water supply.

(R. 556).
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Plaintiffs cite First English Evangelical Lutheran Church
v. County of Los Angeles,

U.S.

, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987)

and Nollan v. California Coastal Commission/

U.S.

, 107

S. Ct. 3141 (1987) as establishing a compensable taking.
Neither case is applicable and both are clearly distinguishable.
First English involves a "temporary regulatory taking" in
which a subsequently invalidated county ordinance deprived a
property owner of all uses of his land.

The court stated:

We merely hold that where the government's activities
have already worked a taking of all use of property no
subsequent action by the government can relieve it of
the duty to provide compensation for the period during
which the taking was effective.
We also point out that the allegation of the complaint
which we treat as true for purpose of our decision was
that the ordinance in question denied appellant all
use of its property.
First English, 107 S. Ct. at 2389 (emphasis added).
In First English, the Supreme Court clarified its prior
holdings in the area of regulatory takings by establishing that
under some circumstances a "temporary" regulatory taking may
exist where a land owner has been denied "all uses" of his
property.

However, the court in that case, in the context of a

motion to dismiss, specifically did not decide whether the
ordinance in question actually denied the property owner all
uses of the property and retained the threshold requirement
that a property owner must be denied all uses in order to
constitute a compensable taking under the federal
constitutional guarantees.

107 S. Ct. at 2384, 2388.
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Appellant's reliance on Nollan, supra, is also misplaced.
Nollan involved the conditioning of permission to rebuild a
home on the transfer to the public of a right-of-way easement.
The Nollan court "recognized that land use regulation does not
effect a taking if it 'substantially advances legitimate state
interest' and does not 'deny an owner economically viable use
of its land.'"

Nollan, 107 S. Ct. at 3146.

The No11an court focused on the first of the two requirements and found a taking because the exaction of an easement
under the circumstances of the case, did not substantially
advance legitimate state interests.

IdL at 3148. Deeding over

a right-of-way easement utterly failed to advance the purpose
of the California law in question.

_Id. The easement was

unrelated to the public's view of the beaches.

The Nollan

court noted, however, that if the Coastal Commission had
attached to the building permit some condition related to the
public's ability to see the beach, no taking would have
occurred.

_Id. at 3147-48.

The court provided the example of

placing height and width restrictions on the beach front home.
Id.

Thus, Nollan is distinguishable on its facts and by appli-

cation of the substantial state interest test which is not at
issue here.
The Supreme Court in Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc, v. De
Benedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987) reaffirmed the
high threshold requirement for a compensable taking to exist,
even to the extent of validating a state statutory scheme that
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required leaving fifty percent of recoverable coal deposits in
place in order to support structures.
Every zoning scheme adopted by a local governmental
authority has some impact on surrounding property values.
Assuming arguendo some validity to the Rollers' claim that
passage of Ordinance 81-1 resulted in diminution in the value
of their property, the claim of diminution fails to meet the
burden of demonstrating a compensable taking since the Rollers
did not show that they were deprived of all uses of their
property.
It is a well established rule that governmental regulation
of the use of private property cannot be deemed to amount to a
taking in the constitutional sense, for which the land owner
would be entitled to receive compensation, unless the regulation deprives the owners of any and all economically viable use
of the property.

As the Tenth Circuit noted in C. F. Lytle Co.

v. Clark, 491 F.2d 834 (10th Cir. 1974):
The due process and just compensation clauses of the
state and federal constitutions do not require that
zoning ordinances permit a landowner to make the most
profitable use of his property. For there to be a
taking the landowner must show that he has been
deprived all reasonable uses of his land.
Id. at 838.

(Emphasis added.) Accord, Rent Island Joint

Venture v. Smith, 452 F. Supp. 455, 460-61 (D. Md. 1978).
The Rollers' claim of diminution in value relies on the
fiction that, but for the regulation in question, it would have
been sold to a willing buyer by a willing purchaser.
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The

evidence is clear that the Rollers were not offering and in
fact would not under any circumstances sell their property.
Furthermore, even if the Rollers could present evidence that
their property had diminished in value because of Cornish's
enactment of Ordinance 81-1, a long line of Supreme Court cases
recognizes that the right to use ones property is always
subject to the reasonable exercise of the police power, and
that virtually all zoning decisions have some economic impact
on property values.

Mere diminution in property value is

insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating a taking by
regulation.

See, e.g. Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New

York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978) (unspecified loss in value);
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (seventy-five
percent loss of value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915) (eighty-seven and a half percent loss of value).
Moreover, Rollers' taking claim must fail because it did
not result in the loss of all economically viable use.

The

Rollers did not lose all economically viable use of the land.
The Rollers continued to farm the land in question after the
enactment of Ordinance 81-1 and the record does not indicate a
loss of all economically viable use.

In fact, the yield

records and fertilization history submitted by Rollers did not
reflect any significant change in farming practice after 1981.
(See Defendants' Exhibit 30, Hearing on Order of Immediate
Occupancy.)
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Roller admitted that he has fertilized in the Pearson
protection area since enactment of the ordinance.

(Trial Tr.

Vol. Ill, p. 149). For example, in 1984 he used 50 pounds of
nitrogen per acre.

(Trial Tr. Vol. Ill, p. 150). The evidence

does not indicate any decreased production yields of the
Rollers' farm land after the enactment of Ordinance 81-1.
Defendants' Exhibit 30).

(See

In fact, the Rollers' appraiser

testified that they had one of the highest agricultural yields
in Utah.

(Trial Tr. Vol. I, p. 49). Moreover, the evidence

indicates that Cornish suspended the enforcement of the
ordinance because there was no way to enforce it.

(Transcript,

Hearing p. 30). Thus, the court did not err in holding that
enactment of the ordinance did not constitute a taking.
Finally, the Rollers' claim of a taking should be denied
since there is a possibility of future use of the property.

In

MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340, 106
S. Ct. 2561 (1986), the United Supreme Court reiterated a
finality requirement on taking claims.

Summary judgment, the

court held, must be granted if there is a possibility that
"some development will be permitted."

Jd. at 2568.

In

MacDonald the plaintiff had submitted a proposal to subdivide
its property into single and multi-family residential lots.
The County Planning Commission rejected the proposal and the
County Board of Supervisors affirmed.
filed a taking claim.

Plaintiff subsequently

Finding that some other development of

the land was still possible, the court affirmed denial of the
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taking claim as premature.

Id. at 2565, 2568-2569.

Even if

the Rollers had fully complied with Ordinance 81-1, which they
did not, the evidence does not support their claim that the
land lost all economic viability.

The land is still

agriculturally viable and compliance with the ordinance could
have resulted in continued operations.

See also Williamson Co.

Regional Planning v. Hamilton Bank, 105 S. Ct. 3108 (1985).
B.

The Valuation Date of the Property Taken by Eminent Domain
was Appropriately Determined to be the Date of Service of
Summons.
The appellants seek to have this Court rule that the date

of taking and thus the date of valuation of their property
should be when Cornish passed Ordinance 81-1. The trial court
found that the taking was deemed to be the date the summons was
served as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 rather than the
date of enactment of Ordinance 81-1.

(R. 580) Furthermore,

the court specifically found that none of the special
circumstances and factors discussed in Utah State Road
Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), upon which the
Rollers relied, was present in this case to justify a valuation
date other than the date of service of summons.

(R. 581).

That factual determination should not be disturbed unless
clearly erroneous.
Friberg involved an unusual and unigue fact situation where
the condemnee was served with process seven years before the
case proceeded to a final decree.

The court's ruling was based

upon the lengthy delays in the proceedings and the fact that
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the value of the property increased substantially during the
prolonged proceeding so that valuation at the time of service
would be fundamentally unfair.
The trial court in the instant case correctly determined
that none of those special facts and circumstances were
present.

The Rollers' property did not significantly

appreciate in value.

Most significantly, as set forth above,

the enactment of Ordinance 81-1 did not constitute a
compensable "taking" of the property.

Thus, the Rollers did

not meet their burden of rebutting the applicable presumption
that the date for determining valuation was the date of service
of process.
POINT FOUR
CORNISH TOWN DID NOT ABANDON ANY OF ITS
CLAIMS AND, THEREFORE, THE ROLLERS MAY NOT
RECOVER ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS IN
CONNECTION THEREWITH.
The Rollers assert that Cornish abandoned at the time of
trial claims involving mineral rights and for taking in fee
simple.

Defendants' characterization of the amendment of

plaintiff's complaint to seek only a perpetual easement rather
than fee simple as an "abandonment" is erroneous and contrary
to the statutory framework applicable to eminent domain
proceedings in Utah.
Cornish's amendment of its pleadings was triggered by an
offer of proof on the first day of trial that the property to
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be condemned in fee was underlaid with valuable minerals.

The

Rollers never put Cornish on notice, by pleadings or otherwise,
of a claim of valuable mineral rights until the morning of the
first day of trial.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 4)

Cornish's amendment therefore was analogous to an amendment
to conform to the evidence and not to some voluntary abandonment on the part of Cornish with full knowledge of all the
factors involved.

Cornish had no right or need to the subsur-

face mineral rights.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 4). Rollers'

proffer that the surface ground was underlaid with valuable
minerals sufficiently valuable to justify extraction triggered
the provision of the statute that the condemning authority
could, under such circumstances, acquire only a perpetual
easement.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 15).

The relevant statute provides that a fee simple may be
taken except in cases where valuable mineral deposits exist
under the surface ground.

In such cases:

"where surface

ground is underlaid with minerals, coal or other deposits
sufficiently valuable to justify extraction, only a perpetual
easement may be taken over the surface ground over such
deposits."

Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2(1) (1987) (emphasis added).

When suddenly faced with a claim that valuable mineral
rights existed, plaintiff was required by statute to amend its
complaint.

The statute mandated that only a perpetual easement

could be taken.

Cornish did what it was required to do.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 7.)

To attempt to construe plaintiff's
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compliance with the statute as an abandonment is erroneous.
The abandonment statute contemplates a voluntary dismissal of
the entire condemnation action and does not apply in a
situation where the condemnor has no authority to take in fee
the property in question.

See Martineau v. State Conservation

Commission, 54 Wis. 76, 194 N.W.2d 664, 669 (1972).
A.

The Statutory Language Mandates that the Rollers' Claim for
Attorneys' Fees and Costs Should Be Rejected.
1.

The Statute Contemplates a Complete Abandonment of the
Proceedings Which Did Not Occur in this Case.

There is no right to recover attorneys' fees in a
condemnation proceeding except as authorized by statute.
Statutes allowing the taxation of costs and attorneys' fees in
eminent domain proceedings against the state are in derogation
of the common law and should be strictly construed.

Martineau

v. State Conservation Commission, supra, 194 N.W.2d at 666.
The Utah statute provides for the recovery of attorneys' fees
in only very limited instances:
Condemnor, whether a public or private body, may, at
any time prior to final payment of compensation and
damages awarded the defendant by the court or jury,
abandon the proceedings and cause the action to be
dismissed without prejudice, provided, however, that
as a condition of dismissal condemnor first compensate
condemnee for all damages he has sustained and also
reimburse him in full for all reasonable and necessary
expenses actually incurred by condemnee because of the
filing of the action by condemnor, including
attorneys' fees.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-16 (1987) (emphasis added).
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The term "abandon" contemplates or implies intentional,
voluntary action.

Detroit International Bridge Co. v. American

Seed Co., 249 Mich. 289, 228 N.W. 791, 795 (1930).

Abandonment

consists of the intentional, voluntary relinquishment of a
known right.
785 (1933).

Los Angeles v

Abbott, 129 Cal. App. 144, 18 P.2d

Here, the only rights of Cornish Town in connec-

tion with the condemnation of the Rollers1 property were those
granted by statute.

Since the statute mandates the acquisition

of only a perpetual easement rather than fee simple where
surface ground is underlaid with valuable minerals, there was
no relinquishment of a "known right."

As previously set forth,

where the condemnor was forced to amend the complaint to comply
with a statutory grant of authority to take, there is no
abandonment.

Furthermore, Cornish never knew of or sought the

mineral rights claimed and thus, it was not abandoning any
previously intentionally-sought rights or "known rights."
Moreover, the statute is written in the conjunctive:

in

order to award the defendant attorneys' fees, the condemnor
must abandon the proceedings and the action must be dismissed.
The statute contemplates a complete surrender of the entire
proceedings and the attempt to condemn.

It requires the

condemnor to abandon "the proceedings," i.e. to give up on its
efforts to acquire by eminent domain all of the property in
question.

The actions of Cornish Town cannot possibly be

construed as an abandonment of the proceedings.
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The only Utah case interpreting the Utah statute is Provo
City v. Cropper, 28 Utah 2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972).

That case

involved the complete abandonment of an eminent domain
proceeding and dismissal of the action because the valuation
placed on the property was too high for the city to pay.

The

legislature in passing this statute deemed it appropriate to
impose the condemnee's costs on the condemnor where the
condemnor initiated and then failed to carry through with
condemnation proceedings.

The court in Cropper stated that

"the statute was designed to correct a problem of unfairness in
casting a burden upon the owners of private property in this
type of proceeding when the condemnor elects not to go ahead
with the acquisition."

^d. at 630.

The problem that the statute was designed to deal with is
not present here.

In the instant case, Cornish went ahead with

its acquisition and did not dismiss the proceedings or otherwise fail to carry the proceedings through to a conclusion.
The trial court correctly held that there was no abandonment
because Cornish did not dismiss the cause of action and that
although the proceedings were changed because of the statute to
seek only a perpetual easement, this did not constitute abandonment.

(Hearing Tr. 3-23-88, pp. 31-32.)

Eminent domain is a creature of statute.

The Utah statute

does not provide for the payment of costs and attorneys' fees
in this case where an amendment to the complaint was made to
conform to the statute.

Although Cornish disputes the
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characterization of its amendment to the complaint as a partial
abandonment, even if it could be so considered, the Utah
statute only provides for payment of costs and fees in
circumstances constituting a total abandonment and dismissal of
the action prior to a conclusion.
2.

The Cases Cited by the Rollers Involve a Different
Statutory Framework and Thus are Not Applicable.

The Rollers cite, inter alia, two California cases in
support of their argument that when a portion of the original
claim has been eliminated or omitted by an amendment to the
complaint, this constitutes an abandonment justifying the award
of costs and attorneys' fees.

See Merced Irrigation District

v. Woolstenhulme, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833, 483 P.2d 1 (1971); County
of Kern v. Galatas, 200 Cal. App. 2d 353, 19 Cal. Rptr. 348
(Cal. App. 1962).

These cases were based on Section 1255a of

the California Code of Civil Procedure, a now repealed statute,
which was substantially different than Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-34-16 (1987).
The California statute imposed costs on the plaintiff in
the case of even an implied or partial abandonment.

It also

had no provision that required that the condemnor dismiss the
entire action, which is expressly set forth in the Utah
statute.

The current California statute is based primarily on

former Section 1255a and specifically provides for the payment
of costs and attorneys' fees in the case of a partial
abandonment by an amendment to the complaint to significantly
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reduce the property or property interest being taken.
no similar statutory provision in Utah.

There is

See §§ 1268.510 &

1268.610 California Code of Civil Procedure.

The statutes of

the states in the other cases cited by the plaintiff are also
likely substantively different than the Utah statute. See,
e.g., Independent School District v. Gross, 291 Minn. 158, 190
N.W.2d 651, 658 (1971) (partial recitation of statute substantially different from the Utah statute).
The statutory framework in Utah is different from those
jurisdictions from which the Rollers attempt to muster authority
for their argument.

Unlike some other states, in Utah no award

of attorneys' fees and costs in the case of a partial abandonment is allowed.

Thus, the cases cited by defendants are

inapposite and do not provide meaningful assistance to the
court in resolving this issue.

On the other hand, the plain

and unambiguous language of the Utah statute, which this Court
must apply, only imposes the condemnee's costs on the condemnor
in the case of a total abandonment and subsequent dismissal of
the action.
B.

As a Matter of Policy, the Rollers' Demand for Attorneys'
Fees and Costs Should Be Rejected.
The Rollers failed to make any claims of valuable mineral

rights underlying the property to be condemned until the
morning of the first day of trial. Although the Rollers
provided the names of their witnesses approximately a week
before trial, counsel for the defendants refused in the face of
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a direct request, to divulge the subject matter of the witnesses' testimony in any way which would have enabled Cornish
to be placed on notice that a claim was being asserted of
valuable mineral rights underlying the property so as to
trigger the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-2(1) (1987)
(R. 899).
The parties also agreed to and did exchange appraisals
prior to trial.

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p. 5). The Rollers'

appraisal did not indicate that defendants made any claim of
valuable mineral rights nor did it even refer to the existence
of minerals underlying the surface.

There was thus no

valuation of any mineral rights included in the appraisal of
fair market value.

(Trial Tr., Vol III, p. 8-9). The value of

Rollers' mineral right claims should have been part of the
subject matter of the appraisal.

The first Cornish heard of

the claim of $38 million in extractable mineral deposits on the
property was the morning of the first day of trial.
Furthermore, the assertion of a claim of valuable mineral
rights upon the property is properly a claim which should have
been raised by counterclaim or affirmative pleading.

Cornish

should have been placed on notice that the Rollers claimed that
the condemnation would take valuable mineral rights.

The

Rollers never gave any notice of this claim, although they had
numerous opportunities to do so in the hearing on the order of
immediate occupancy October 8-10, 1986 and an evidentiary
hearing on various other matters held on December 21, 1987.
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It

was incumbent on the defendants to raise the claim of valuable
mineral rights by pleading and at the hearing on the order of
immediate occupancy.

Instead, the Rollers engaged in trial by

ambush and kept this claim hidden from Cornish until trial
began.
This Court should not countenance the Rollers' demand for
attorneys' fees and costs based on their assertion of
abandonment.

From a practical standpoint, had the Rollers

notified Cornish of this claim previously, they could have
saved the attorneys' fees and costs they now seek to recover.
Defendants' disingenuous attempt to hide a $38 million demand
until the morning of trial and then force plaintiff to make a
so-called "abandonment" of the mineral claim because of the
enormity of the potential claim should not be rewarded.
POINT FIVE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
OF MINERAL RIGHTS.
The court properly excluded evidence of the value of the
minerals underlying the property.

In State v. Runimoto, 62

Hawaii 502, 617 P.2d 93 (1980), a case cited by Rollers, the
court recognized the principle that the trial judge has broad
discretionary authority to admit or exclude evidence and that
its exercise of discretion will not be upset unless there is a
clear abuse of discretion.

Ld. at 97. With respect to a

possible future use of the property, appellate courts have not
been disposed to disturb the trial court's rejection of such
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evidence even where its implementation was only a possibility.
Honolulu v. International Air Service Co., 63 Hawaii 322, 628
P.2d 192, 201 (1981).

Cf. County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55

Hawaii 677, 517 P.2d 57, 64 (1973), cert, denied on another
issue, 419 U.S. 872 (1974) (evidence of an owner's plans for
the development of his property, even if such development is
possible, is inadmissible if it is not shown that there is a
reasonable probability that it can be undertaken).
The United States Supreme Court has stated in Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246 (1934):
Elements affecting value that depend upon events or
combinations of occurrences which, while within the
realm of possibility, are not fairly shown to be
reasonably probable, should be excluded from
consideration, for that would be to allow mere
speculation and conjecture to become a guide for the
ascertainment of value - a thing to be condemned in
business transactions as well as in judicial
ascertainment of truth.
Id. at 257.
The trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence
should not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears that the
court was clearly in error.

Utah Dept. of Transportation v.

Jones, 694 P.2d 1031, 1037 (Utah 1984).

In State v. Jacobs, 16

Utah 2d 167, 397 P.2d 463 (1964), the trial court excluded
evidence relating to the proposed development of the property.
This Court held that the trial court did not err in excluding
the evidence.

The Court held:

The owner of property under condemnation is entitled
to a value based upon the highest and best use to
which it could be put at the time of the taking,
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without limitation as to the use then actually made of
it. However, the projected use, affecting value, must
be not only possible, but reasonably probable. It
must not be merely in the realm of speculation because
the land is adaptable to a particular use in the remote
and uncertain future. In any event, the admission of
such evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court, which was not abused in this case.
Id. at 464.
The court properly considered the Rollers' proffer on the
mineral rights issue to be remote and speculative.

A jury in

an eminent domain proceedings "is insulated from the realities
of the marketplace and hence is not equipped to give proper
weight to indicia of highly remote values."

Honolulu v.

International Air Service Company, Ltd., supra, 628 P.2d at
197.

Thus, courts generally exclude evidence of values which

is so "speculative" as to be unduly confusing to the jury.
Id.

The trial court's vantage point normally affords a clearer

view of the "thin line that often separates competent opinion
and relevant values from mere speculation and 'indicia of
highly remote values,'" than the more distant position of the
appellate court,

^d.

Hence, appellate courts are disinclined

to disturb the trial judge's assessment that the proffered
evidence reflects, or does not reflect, speculation or remote
values, unless a clear abuse of discretion vested in the court
is apparent.

Ld. at 197-198.

There is no evidence in the record, or even Rollers'
proffer, to suggest such valuable mineral rights were known or
reasonably foreseeable as of the date of the taking used to
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determine value.

The question of whether the Rollers could

extract the minerals was determined to be a question to be
raised when, if ever, the minerals were actually to be
extracted.

In United States v. 3,218.9 Acres of Land, 619 F.2d

288 (3rd Cir.) cert, denied, 449 U.S. 872 (1980), the
appellants owned underlying mineral interests and land which
was acquired by the government for a natural forest.

The

declaration of taking stated that the government took the
estate in fee simple subject to, among other things, the
reservation of mineral interests to the owners to enter and
remove the minerals "in accordance with the rules and
regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture."

_Id. at 290.

The

mineral owners argued that the possibility that the secretary's
rules could inhibit the removal of the minerals in the future
presented a present basis for damages.

The court held that the

effect of these rules, if any, did not amount to a taking, and
that the claim was premature.

See also United States v.

1,606.00 Acres of Land, 698 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1983) (a
possible future taking of property cannot give rise to a
present action for damages).
Cornish also took the position that the existing water
rights held by the town may prohibit the extraction of the
minerals claimed by the Rollers in the area of the protection
zones in any event.

Counsel for Rollers admitted that that was

an issue to be determined later on.

(Trial Tr., Vol. II,

p. 8). The court found that the issue of whether the Rollers
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had a right to extract the mineral rights underlying the
surface should also be determined at a later time.

The court

stated "if the time ever came that you wanted to exercise your
right to extract minerals, which you would have the right to do
because Cornish hasn't taken them, that you exercise those
rights, and if there comes some question if its interference
with the dominant estate, then you may have to litigate that."
(Trial Tr. , Vol. II, pp. 11-12).
The case of Wm. E. Russell Coal Company v. Board of County
Commissioners of Boulder County, 129 Colo. 330, 270 P.2d 772
(1954) cited by the defendants in their brief, is easily
distinguishable from the situation here.

In Russell, the coal

company had for many years conducted coal mining operations
under the surface.

In addition, unlike the case here, the

issue that the condemnation of the surface of the land
constituted a taking of the respondents interest in the coal
underlying the land was framed by the pleadings.

The critical

distinction, however, is that Russell involved an ongoing
operation of mineral extraction unlike the speculative and
remote possibility raised here.
The court here found that there was no indication of any
prior use or ongoing extraction of minerals on the Roller
property and that for the defendant on the morning of the first
day of trial to claim valuable minerals underlying the farm in
the amount of $38 million dollars was not only untimely but
very speculative in nature.

(Trial tr. Vol. Ill, page 4).
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The

court concluded that the proffered evidence was speculative
based upon the Rollers' belief that there may be minerals under
the property and that the minerals may be valuable, where there
has never been any extraction operation at the time of taking
and that it was highly speculative whether the extraction of
the minerals could be carried out by the Rollers.

(Trial Tr.,

Vol. Ill, p. 5).
POINT SIX
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
OF THE VALUE OF HUNTING ACCESS PERMITS AS A
SEPARATE ELEMENT OF COMPENSABLE DAMAGES.
The Rollers asserted that the highest and best use of the
property to be condemned was as a cultivated dry farm with wild
life resources.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 25). Contrary to the

Rollers' assertion in their brief, they were allowed to put on
extensive evidence regarding the wild life potential of the
property.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, pp. 76-82).

They were allowed

to put on evidence that the deer herd on the property added to
the total value of the property and was one of the factors to
be considered in determining fair market value.

(Trial Tr.,

Vol. I, p. 85).
Mr. Roller testified that approximately 300 head of deer
were on his property and that anywhere from 50 to 100 fawn
would be produced a year.

There was testimony that permits to

hunt on the property could be sold.
pp. 16-17).

(Trial Tr., Vol. Ill,

The Rollers' appraiser testified that exclusive
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use was necessary in order to sell access permits, and Mr.
Roller testified that exclusive use would be destroyed by the
condemnation.

(Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, p. 21). The court held

that the Rollers were entitled to show what a willing buyer on
August 5, 1986 would pay for the property and that after the
taking a willing buyer would pay less for the remaining
property because of the damage done by reason of the taking to
the potential value of the hunting rights.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I,

p. 87). The Rollers' appraiser, using an income approach,
calculated that the value of the wildlife resource was
$52,740.

(Trial Tr., Vol. I, p. 91, Vol. II, p. 66).

The only evidence on that issue which was excluded was the
testimony by Shane Davis, an employee of Deseret Land and
Livestock Company.

The court sustained an objection to the

introduction of income and expense figures for Deseret Land and
Livestock on the grounds that the two properties were not
comparable.

(Trial Tr., Vol. II, p. 93).

A given piece of land has only one market value and not a
certain market value for one purpose and a different market
value for another purpose.

Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake

City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 49 (Utah 1974).

The jury is

permitted to consider in determining fair market value, the
highest and most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable to the extent that the prospect of demand for such
use affects the market value.
364, 366 (Alaska 1970).
held that:

State v. 7.026 Acres, 466 P.2d

In State v. 7.026 Acres, the court

Such adaptability, merely within the realm of
possibility is not sufficient. It must be shown that
the use for which the property is claimed to be
adaptable is reasonably probable. If this cannot be
shown, evidence of prospective use must be excluded
because it would allow mere conjecture and speculation
to become a guide for ascertainment of value, and this
is not a permissible method for the judicial ascertainment of truth.
Id. at 366.
It can certainly be argued that the Rollers should not have
been allowed to introduce any evidence on the value of the deer
herd.

Rollers' valuation calculation was arrived at by an

income approach using the potential sale of hunting access
permits.

Prior to the date of taking, however, the Rollers had

never received a fee from anyone for hunting deer on the
property.

(Trial Tr., Vol. Ill, P. 119). Ordinarily

subsequent occurrences are not admissible to determine value.
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui Investment,
Inc., supra, 522 P.2d at 1372.

The prospective use of the

property for the sale of hunting access permits is based on
conjecture and speculation and should not be a determinant of
value.
The Rollers were not entitled to put on a separate
calculation of the loss of business potential based upon the
future use of the property for the sale of hunting access
permits.

They had already placed into evidence testimony

regarding the incremental increase in the fair market value of
the property based upon an income calculation for the use of
the wildlife resource.

The defendants are not entitled to a
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valuation of the use of the property for hunting access permits
independently of the land of which it is a part.

The land was

valued with the wildlife resource given due consideration as a
component part of the land.
305 P.2d 495, 498 (1957).

See State v. Noble/ 6 Utah 2d 40,
In Noble, the court stated that:

courts have with great unanimity rejected the
proposition that just compensation is the equivalent
of the total profits which would be realized from the
future operations of the property. The measure of
damages is (said to be) the market value of the
property and not the output thereof. The accepted
formula for determining fair market value is not how
much would the property produce over a period of
fifteen years, but what would a purchaser willing to
buy but not required to do so pay, and what would a
seller willing to sell but not required to do so, ask.
Id. at 498.
In State v. Ouzounian, 26 Utah 2d 442, 491 P.2d 1093
(1971), the court held that business profits are not the
subject of independent compensation aside and apart from the
market value of the land seized, upon which the business has
been conducted.

_Id. at 1095.

The court held that such a

calculation would be remote and speculative to be used as the
criterion of the market value of the land upon which such
business was conducted.

_Id. at 1095.

Thus, although the court allowed the defendants to
introduce evidence as to the impact of the wildlife resource on
the fair market value of the property, it properly disallowed
evidence of speculative future lost profits for use of the land
through the sale of hunting access permits.
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POINT SEVEN
COSTS, INCLUDING THE COSTS OF PREPARATION OF
TRANSCRIPTS AND EXHIBITS, WERE PROPERLY NOT
AWARDED.
The trial court properly refused to award the costs
requested by the Rollers of $2,252.65.

The court, however,

awarded the Rollers $74.00 in costs constituting the amount of
the jury fee and a witness fee.

The court properly disallowed

the balance of the expenses sought.

The court held that the

remaining expenses sought by the Rollers, including $1,468.00
for photographs, were not properly taxable as costs.

(Hearing

Tr. 3-23-88, p. 12).
Costs are those fees which are required to be paid to the
court and to witnesses and for which the statutes authorize
inclusion in the judgment.
774 (Utah 1980).

Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771,

They are generally allowable only in the

amounts and in the manner provided by statute.

The expenses

sought by the appellants do not fall within the category of
authorized costs.

Utah courts have distinguished between

legitimate and taxable "costs" and other "expenses" of
litigation which may be necessary but are not properly taxable
as costs.

:id-

Only the former are properly recoverable.

In Frampton, the court held that expenses for a model,
photographs and certified copies of documents necessary to
present plaintiff's case were not properly taxable as costs.
Id. at 774.

In Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052 (Utah App.

1987), the court held that the cost of a survey the owner had
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conducted and which was necessary to assist in the preparation
of the case could not be recovered by the owner as a "cost" and
that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding
plaintiff the costs relating to the survey.

_Id. at 1055.

See

Stratford v. Wood, 11 Utah 2d 251, 358 P.2d 80, 81 (1961)
(survey cost made in preparation of plaintiff's case not in the
nature of costs or damages).

Thus, Rollers' argument that they

should be awarded their expenses as taxable costs because the
expenses were necessarily incurred in order to present their
case should be rejected.

Whether or not the expenses were

incurred in order to present the case is not the issue.

The

issue is whether the costs were required to be paid to the
court or to witnesses and in this case they were not.
Most importantly, however, the trial court has broad
discretion in connection with the grant or denial of costs.
The court has a duty to guard against any excesses or abuses in
the taking thereof.
773-74.

Frampton v. Wilson, supra, 605 P.2d at

Here, the court property guarded against excess and

abuse by denying appellants' request for an award of $2,252.65
in costs.

The trial court certainly did not abuse its

discretion in refusing to award as costs the expenses claimed
by the appellants and this court should not reverse the trial
court's determination on the award of costs since no abuse of
discretion has been shown.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent, Cornish Town, respectfully submits that the
decision of the trial court should be affirmed in all respects
lis
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